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Confrontation During COVID:
A Fundamental Right, Virtually Guaranteed
Daniel Robinson
The novel threats posed to our criminal justice system by the
COVID-19 pandemic and attendant shutdowns of courts beg the
question of whether our must fundamental pillars of law can
withstand the ultimate test of time. And inherent in the ultimate
test of time is the ultimate test of technology—this is, will there
come a time that technology outgrows the confines of our legal
landscape? Consider this: The United States Constitution
guarantees every criminal defendant the right to confront their
accuser in court; yet, for a substantial period of time in 2020,
court, as we knew it, was nothing more than a live, two-way,
video-telecommunications stream. Is confrontation via live, twoway video-telecommunication sufficient to comport with the
fundamental rights guaranteed to criminal defendants under the
Constitution? Fortunately, the era of the Coronavirus Court has
largely come to an end with courts re-opening and the massdissemination of vaccines and booster shots worldwide; however,
the question remains whether we, as a society, are prepared to
recognize that the legal landscape of the criminal justice system
is changing. And moreover, whether the law, as it is understood
and applied today, contemplates this idea that traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice are ever-developing in light of
technological and societal advancements.
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When we are dealing with the words of the Constitution,
we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters . . . .The
case before us must be considered in light of our whole
experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The last time the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court met
in person for oral arguments was March 4th, 2020. And shortly thereafter,
on May 5th, 2020, for the first time in history, the United States Supreme
Court heard remote oral arguments—over the phone—and live-streamed
the audio directly through their website. The case was United States Patent
& Trademark Office v. Booking.com,2 an intellectual property dispute, and
for most of the hour-plus long debate, the Court made its first successful
foray at live-streamed, teleconferenced arguments. That said, Justice
Sotomayor may have briefly forgotten to unmute her phone during the
hearing; Justice Breyer’s connection seemingly faltered for a second or
two, turning part of his question into a jumbled mess; and at one point the
unmistakable sound of a toilet was heard flushing.
The outbreak of the novel SARS-CoV-2 (“COVID-19”) pandemic has
perpetuated a seismic shift in our nations legal landscape over the last year.
Many federal and state courts have indefinitely suspended in person
proceedings, including a near-total shutdown of criminal and civil jury
trials. In one Fairfax County Circuit Court, the prosecutor reported to
Courtroom 4J with a tape measure, the public defender arrived with a bag
full of six-foot lengths of rope, and a defense attorney showed up lugging
a bag of hockey sticks. 3 The attorneys used the tape measure, rope and
hockey stick to mark off the proper social distancing for everyone who
would be involved in a future proceeding.4
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934) (citing Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
2
United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S.Ct. 2298
(2020). A see also citation to a record, transcript, or article may be appropriate at the end
of the sentence, because the case itself does not address what happened during oral
arguments.
3
Ann E. Marimow & Justin Jouvenal, Courts dramatically rethink the jury trial in the
era of the coronavirus, THE WASH. POST (July 31, 2020, 8:54 AM).
4
Id.
1
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Alternatively, some jurisdictions have responded to court closures by
adopting live, two-way video-teleconference5 (“VTC”) technology
platforms.6 VTC technology allows a witness to testify in real time from
anywhere in the world, and be seen and heard in the courtroom as if they
were testifying in person. While this most recent development marks a first
in our nation’s history, our courtrooms are no stranger to the application
of advancements in modern technology. Over the last few decades, courts
have adopted electronic discovery, software-enabled exhibits, natural
language processing for documents, and even procedures enabling the
admission of remote testimony in criminal court. However, the magnitude
and sheer necessity of our current health crisis has perpetuated a new
development in the application of modern technology to courtroom
procedures. Remote, two-way VTC platforms like Zoom and Webex that
have come to facilitate the practice of law throughout the pandemic have
called into question many traditional notions and long-standing practices
previously understood as essential to the administration of justice—
namely, the need for a physical courtroom.
Notwithstanding the vast potential benefits of integrating VTC into
our courtrooms in terms of administrative and procedural efficiency and
access to justice, however the use of this technology raises a number of
constitutional concerns ostensibly at odds with the fundamental guarantee
that a criminal defendant has the right to confront adverse witnesses
against them. And the right of confrontation, as enshrined in the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, is not a virtual guarantee. As Justice
Scalia said, “[v]irtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual
constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones.”7
However, the course of VTC jurisprudence has proven that, under
certain circumstances, VTC can still allow for the defendant to see and be
seen by the witness, and vice versa, and can ensure the defendant’s right
to cross-examination—an element of confrontation the Supreme Court has
5

Video-Teleconference (also known as videoconference) is a set of interactive
telecommunication technologies which allow to or more locations to interact via two-way
video and audio transmissions simultaneously. For the purposes of this Comment, VTC
will refer to the use of two-way simultaneous transmission of audio-visual information
picked up by cameras and microphones on one end and communication by monitor and
speakers on the other
6
Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom Jury Trials Become the Norm During the Coronavirus
Pandemic?, A.B.A. J. (May 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/3CPB- B3WF
(“According to the National Center for State Courts, 16 states and the territory of Puerto
Rico have ordered virtual hearings in response to the novel coronavirus . . . . In Texas, the
public has access to hundreds of proceedings on YouTube, where prosecutors, judges,
defendants and public defenders convene on Zoom. In Cook County, Illinois, the public
can watch bond hearings online.”).
7
Id. (emphasis added).
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long considered to be the bedrock of the Confrontation Clause guarantee.8
Nevertheless, Federal trial and appellate courts, as well as the Supreme
Court, have acknowledged that VTC testimony may not satisfy the
Confrontation Clause.
Most often, courts have allowed the use of VTC testimony in the
context of child sex abuse cases, in which the threat of emotional trauma
to the alleged child victim was great.9 And some courts have allowed the
use of VTC testimony due to the terminal illness or disability of the
witness.10 Others have rejected the use of VTC on substantially the same
grounds.11 Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor the legislature
have offered much guidance regarding the permissibility and admissibility
of VTC technology in criminal court, and therefore, lower courts remain
split in their interpretation of the standards controlling the use of VTC
technology with regard to a criminal defendant’s confrontation right.
In light of the grave constitutional questions posed by the admission
of VTC testimony against a criminal defendant, this note examines the
constitutionality of two-way VTC technology in criminal court, with
specific reference to its implications on a criminal defendant’s right to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, and as a matter of public
policy. Then Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court in
McCulloch v. Maryland, said the following:
We must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding . . . .[I]ntended to endure for ages to come, and consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.12
This note advocates that the unprecedented nature of the current health
crisis brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic is precisely that which Chief
Justice Marshall was referring to in his championed McCulloch opinion.
The necessity of integrating technological advancements into the modern
practice of law is demonstrably clear, and our nation’s response to the
COVID-19 pandemic has shown that VTC technology has the potential to
make trial procedures both more efficient and more fair. Courts should not
be constrained from adopting such procedures, in limited circumstances,
when the various crises of human affairs demand it. As such, this note
ultimately argues for a less strict, more practical interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause, in light of modern technology that has come to
redefine confrontation within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
This note will proceed as follows. Part II will begin with an
examination of the development of the Confrontation Clause and the
8
9
10
11
12

See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017-20 (1988).
See infra notes 43 - 52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 75 - 79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86- 93 and accompanying text.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401-14 (1819) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court’s current understanding of the law regarding VTC
testimony. Part II will then discuss the Supreme Court’s rejection of a
proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(b) that
would have permitted the use of live, two-way VTC testimony on VTC
jurisprudence. Part III will outline the inconsistent application of the law
in Federal court. Part IV will discuss three distinct approaches that Federal
courts have used to confront the issue of VTC testimony and consider
efforts to reconcile VTC testimony with the Confrontation Clause. Part V
will address a constitutional framework within which to analyze a
categorical approach to the issue of VTC testimony in light of the COVID19 pandemic. Part VI will conclude this note.

II.
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A PREFERENCE FOR FACETO-FACE CONFRONTATION AT TRIAL13 THAT MUST OCCASIONALLY
GIVE WAY TO CONSIDERATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
NECESSITIES OF THE CASE14
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”15 Similarly, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26 provides that “[i]n every [federal criminal] trial the
testimony of the witness must be taken in open court.”16 The Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment ensures that:
[T]he accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by
his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.17
At its inception, “the primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness.”18 The right of face-to-face confrontation was understood as
provided four procedural safeguards, without which the integrity of the
fact-finding process is called into question: (1) the giving of testimony
13

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
15
U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973);
see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
16
Fed. R. Crim. P. 26(b)
17
See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175
(1970) (“Simply as a matter of English the clause may be read to confer nothing more than
a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.”).
18
Id.
14
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under oath; (2) the opportunity for cross examination; (3) the ability of the
fact-finder to observe demeanor evidence; and (4) the reduced risk that a
witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent defendant when testifying
in his presence.19 That said, the Court has declared that “the Confrontation
Clause only guarantees ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish.’”20

A.
Coy v. Iowa: “Face-to-Face”—The Irreducible Literal
Meaning of Confrontation
Not until the late 1980s did the Court make evidently clear its disdain
against trial procedures that inhibit a defendant’s ability to fully observe
and interact with adverse witnesses. Writing for the Court in Coy v. Iowa,
Justice Scalia explained that it is every defendant’s right to a face-to-face
encounter with an adverse witness which lies at the core of a defendant’s
confrontation rights,21 as that right serves “to ensure the integrity of the
fact finding process.”22 Scalia noted that the element of face-to-face
confrontation was the “irreducible literal meaning of the [Confrontation]
Clause” and that face-to-face confrontation reflects the idea that “there is
something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face
confrontation . . . as ‘essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.’”23
The Coy Court addressed a Confrontation Clause challenge to a
modified trial procedure in which a screen was placed between the
defendant and the child sexual assault victims, “block[ing] [defendant]
from their sight but allow[ing] [defendant] to see them dimly and to hear
them.”24 The Court ultimately rejected the procedure as unconstitutional,
stating it was “difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation
of the defendant’s right to a face-to-face encounter.”25 The Court’s holding
necessarily implied that, while the concerns of protecting victims of sexual
abuse from the emotional trauma of facing their abuser in court is
undeniably important, such concerns do not outweigh the confrontation
rights of the accused. While the Court explicitly declined to address the
question of whether an exception exists, dicta suggests the Court

19

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295; see
also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
20
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 20 (1985)) (emphasis added).
21
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020-21 (1988).
22
Id. at 1020.
23
Id. at 1017-21.
24
Id. at 1014-15.
25
Id. at 1020
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acknowledged a construction of the rule in which an exception could be
made, however, it left that inquiry to the district courts. 26

B.
Maryland v. Craig: The Standard for One-Way VTC
Testimony
Only once has the Supreme Court addressed the issue of VTC
testimony and its implications on the Confrontation Clause. Just two years
after Coy, in the case of Maryland v. Craig, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of a Maryland law permitting a child sex abuse victim to
testify via a one-way closed circuit television to avoid the emotional
trauma of having to face their abuser.27 Under the procedure in issue, the
child witness, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel broke-out into a
room adjacent the Courtroom and examined/cross-examined the child,
while the defendant, judge, and the jury remained in the courtroom.28 The
defendant and the jury could see and hear the testimony of the witness, but
had no opportunity to observe the witness in person, and the witness could
neither see, hear, nor interact with the defendant.
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained that the testimony
did not violate the Confrontation Clause, noting the Court has “never held
[ ] that the confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the
absolute right to face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at
trial.”29 The majority established a two-part test to evaluate the
constitutionality of VTC testimony: the right to confront accusatory
witnesses may be satisfied “absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation”
only where the prosecution can demonstrate case-specific finding that: (1)
“denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy,”30 and (2) “the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”31
As applied to the facts in Craig, the Court first made a threshold
determination that the procedure was “necessary to protect a child from
[the] trauma [of confronting her abuser]”32—i.e., the procedure was
necessary to further compelling interest. Furthermore, the Court
determined the VTC procedure in issue had sufficient indicia of
reliability.33 It concluded that the procedure preserved all of the essential
Id. at 1021 (“We leave for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions
exist. Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only when necessary to further
an important public policy.”).
27
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840-41 (1990).
28
Id. at 857-60.
29
Id. at 844.
30
Id. at 852-53.
31
Id. at 850.
32
Id. at 857.
33
Id. at 845-46.
26
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elements of confrontation: (1) testimony under oath; (2) witness crossexamination; and (3) the opportunity to assess the demeanor of the witness
as she testified in a manner “functionally equivalent to that accorded live,
in-person testimony”—with the exception of only one: the reduced risk of
a witness “wrongfully implicat[ing] an innocent defendant” by testifying
in his presence. 34 In this way, the Craig court promulgated a forward looking, practical approach to an examination of the confrontation right,
considering policy aims in light of the purpose of confrontation to
determine cases in which it is not necessary to preserve all four elements.
“Although face-to-face confrontation forms ‘the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause,’35 [the Court] ha[s] nevertheless
recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right.”36 And
the Court’s forward-thinking disposition on the case left the door open for
lower courts to consider the policy aims of the Confrontation Clause in
light of the technological advancements that are now entrenched in the
modern practice of law. And in so ruling, the Supreme Court made clear
that the demands of the Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation were
not absolute—in at least some criminal cases, a physical, face-to-face
encounter between the defendant and an adverse witness is not necessary
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.

C.
Crawford v. Washington: Redefining Our Understanding of
Confrontation
Before Crawford, the Confrontation Clause was understood as a
substantive guarantee that any the testimony admitted against a defendant
in was reliable because of the fact that it was given in open court.37
Id. at 845—46, 851 (explaining the witness “must be competent to testify and must
testify under oath; the defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous crossexamination; and the judge, jury; and defendant are able to view the demeanor of the
witness as he or she testifies”).
35
Green, 399 U.S. at 157.
36
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is
given a full and fair opportunity to prove and expose [testimonial] [sic] infirmities [such
as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] [sic] through cross examination, thereby calling to
the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’
testimony.”).
37
Id. at 846. (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (“[T]he right to
confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of promoting reliability in a criminal
trial . . . .”)); see also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (“[T]he confrontation
guarantee serves . . . symbolic goals . . . [and] promotes reliability . . . .”); see also Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161)
(“[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth determining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of fact
[has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony].’”).
34
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“[T]hese means of testing accuracy are so important that the absence of
proper confrontation at trial ‘calls into question the ultimate integrity of
the fact-finding process.’”38 The Crawford Court, however, under a more
narrow interpretation of the Clause, determined that the right was purely a
procedural guarantee—one which demanded actual confrontation—not a
guarantee in which one may read into it substantive aims such as
reliability, in subversion of the procedural guarantee.39
The Crawford Court overruled the previously long-standing
interpretation of the Clause enunciated in Ohio v. Roberts, requiring that
testimonial hearsay40 bear “sufficient ‘indicia of reliability,’”41 in favor of
a more concrete construction of the Clause—”where testimonial evidence
is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”42 Scalia
made his disdain for the Roberts test quite clear:
[A]dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally
at odds with the right of confrontation . . . .Dispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial
because a defendant is obviously guilty. That is not what the Sixth
Amendment prescribes.”43
The majority’s construction of the Clause marked a seismic shift in
the Courts understanding of the right to confrontation. In making its
determination, the Court rejected the view that the Confrontation Clause
applies of its own force only to in-court testimony, and that its application
to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon “the law of
evidence for the time being.”44 Justice Scalia emphasized the fact that
leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the Rules of Evidence
at the time of being “would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to
prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices,”45 and that the right

38

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate
goal is to ensure the reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”).
40
An out-of-court statement made to further an ongoing or future investigation, offered
for the truth of the matter asserted.
41
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 68.
42
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
43
Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
44
Id. at 50-51 (citing 3 Wigmore § 1397, at 101); accord, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
45
Id. at 51.
39
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to Confrontation demands more than “amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”
46

In so holding, the Court did not overrule, or otherwise void the
application of the Craig standard; rather, the Court set out a categorical
approach to determining the applicability of Craig, and in effect, narrowed
the scope of the inquiry. Because Crawford requires unavailability and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination to admit the testimonial hearsay
of an adverse witness, and because VTC can provide an opportunity for
cross-examination,47 it follows that a constitutional rule concerning VTC
based on Crawford would require only that a witness be unavailable, and
that VTC allow for cross-examination of that unavailable witness.

D.
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26
In 2002, the Supreme Court considered a proposed amendment to Rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would have permitted
live, two-way video testimony when a witness is unavailable to testify in
court.48 The proposal did not, however, limit the use of testimony via video
transmission to instances where there has been a “case-specific finding”
that is “necessary to further an important public policy.”49 The Committee
argued that the proposal was constitutional because it allowed video
transmission only where deposition of unavailable witnesses may be read
into evidence pursuant to Rule 15.50 In effect, the Committee applied the
Second Circuit’s rationale in Gigante,51 concluding that VTC afforded
greater protections to the confrontation right than did Rule 15.52 However,
despite the unanimous consent of the Rules Committee and the Judicial
Conference of the United States to approve the amendment, the Court
ultimately rejected the proposal in a 5-3 decision.53
Id. at 61 (“Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence,
much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”).
47
See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
48
See Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 90 (2002).
49
Id. at 93.
50
Id. at 95; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c)(1) (“The officer having custody of a
defendant shall be notified of the time and place set for the examination and shall, unless
the defendant waives in writing the right to be present, produce the defendant at the
examination and keep the defendant in the presence of the witness during the
examination . . . .”); Fed R. Crim. P. 15(c)(2) (“Except as authorized by Rule 15(c)(3), a
defendant who is not in custody has the right upon request to be present at the deposition,
subject to any conditions imposed by the court . . . .”).
51
See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 92.
46
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According to Justice Scalia, the proposal was “of dubious validity
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment” and
“unquestionably contrary to the rule enunciated in Craig.”54 Applying the
Craig standard, Scalia rejected the Committee’s argument that the
proposal was constitutional because it allowed the use of video
transmission to receive testimony only where the deposition of an
unavailable witness may be read into evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 15.55 Scalia points out that the Committee ignores the
fact that the constitutional test applied56 to live testimony in Craig is
different from the test applied57 to the admission of out-of-court
statements.58 Moreover, Scalia argues the rule ignores the fact that Rule
15 nonetheless accords the defendant a right to face-to-face confrontation
during the deposition.59 Making it clear that the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause is to compel accusers to make their accusations in
the defendants presence, Scalia “cannot comprehend how one-way
transmission (which Craig says does not ordinarily satisfy confrontation
requirements) becomes transformed into full-fledged confrontation when
reciprocal transmission is added.”60
On the other hand, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor, would
have transmitted to Congress the Judicial Conference’s proposed
amendment in criminal cases in (1) “exceptional circumstances,” with (2)
“appropriate safeguards,” and if (3) “the witness is unavailable.”61 Breyer
pointed out that this particular construction of the rule, with its three
restrictions, paralleled the circumstances in which federal courts are
authorized to admit depositions in criminal cases.62 He therefore felt it was
“not obvious how video testimony could abridge a defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights in circumstances where an absent witness’
testimony could be admitted in nonvisual form via deposition
regardless.”63 Justice Breyer believed the Court should have forwarded the
proposal despite its constitutional doubts, so that it could later consider
any constitutional problem when the Rule is applied in an individual
54

Id. at 94.
Id.
56
Id. (A case-specific finding that VTC is necessary to further an important public
policy).
57
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
58
Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (“There is thus no basis for
importing the ‘necessity requirement’ announced in [Craig] into the much different context
of out-of-court declarations admitted under established exceptions to the hearsay rule.”).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 15).
63
Id.
55
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case.64 At that point, he said, the Court would have the benefit of the full
argument that it then lacked.65

III.

RELIABILITY V. NECESSITY—VTC TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL
COURT

The constitutionality of VTC testimony has been considered by many
Federal courts and held constitutional where either a compelling need or a
particularized, specific harm, most often where emotional or physical
trauma to a child witness has been demonstrated in the context of sexual
abuse cases.66 The Second Circuit was the first to hold the use of two-way
VTC testimony constitutional in United States v. Gigante, on the grounds
that it preserved the four necessary elements of traditional, in-court
testimony.67 In Gigante, the trial court permitted a witness who was both
terminally ill and participating in the Federal Witness Protection Program
to provide testimony via two-way VTC.68 On appeal, the defendant argued
that the government failed to demonstrate a case-specific finding of
necessity to further an important public policy, pursuant to Craig.69 The
Second Circuit rejected this argument, and declined to apply the Craig
standard, noting the difference between the one-way VTC technology used
there and the two-way VTC technology in the instant case.70 The court
found more relevant the analogue in Rule 1571 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, concluding that the exceptional circumstances
64

Id.
Id. at 97.
66
See United States v. Gigante, 166 F. 3d 75 (2d. Cir. 1999); see also Harrell v.
Butterworth, 251 F. 2d 926 (11th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Benson, 79 F. App’x
813 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F. 3d 306 (5th Cir.
2007).
67
Gigante, 166 F. 3d at 81 (“We agree that the closed-circuit presentation of Savino’s
testimony afforded greater protection of Gigante’s confrontation rights than would have
been provided by a Rule 15 deposition. It forced Savino to testify before the jury, and
allowed them to judge his credibility through his demeanor and comportment; under Rule
15 practice, the bare transcript of Savino’s deposition could have been admitted, which
would have precluded any visual assessment of his demeanor. Closed-circuit testimony
also allowed Gigante’s attorney to weigh the impact of Savino’s direct testimony on the
jury as he crafted a cross-examination.”); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 84546 (1990) (“[T]he salutary effects of face-to-face confrontation include 1) the giving of
testimony under oath; 2) the opportunity for cross examination; 3) the ability of the factfinder to observe demeanor evidence; and 4) the reduced risk that a witness will wrongfully
implicate an innocent defendant when testifying in his presence.”).
68
See Gigante, 166 F. 3d at 75.
69
Id. at 80-81.
70
Id.
71
Id.
65
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requirement for Rule 15 depositions should extend to VTC testimony as
well.72 Satisfied with the trial court’s finding of exceptional
circumstances,73 the court held that VTC testimony “afforded greater
protection of Gigante’s Confrontation rights than would have been
provided by a Rule 15 deposition.”74 The court did, however, make it very
clear that two-way VTC should not be considered a commonplace
substitute for traditional, in-court testimony by a witness, stating “there
may well be intangible elements of the ordeal of testifying in a courtroom
that are reduced or even eliminated by remote testimony.”75
The Fifth76 and Sixth77 Circuits similarly held that VTC testimony may
be constitutional in contexts outside child abuse and sexual assault cases,
including where a witness is terminally ill. In Horn v. Quarterman,
appellate court determined that the procedural guarantees of
trustworthiness and reliability were preserved78 where both an attorney for
the state and counsel for the defendant were present while the witness
72

Id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82. The court used a two-part test to determine if an exceptional circumstance
existed: “‘It is well-settled that the “exceptional circumstances” required to justify the
deposition of a prospective witness are present if that witness’s testimony is material to the
case and if the witness is unavailable to appear at trial.’” Id. at 81 (quoting United States
v. Johnpoll, 739 F. 2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1984)). The court emphasized the witness’s fatal
illness in determining unavailability. Id. at 81-82. “Unavailability is defined by reference
to Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which includes situations in which a
witness ‘is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of . . . physical or mental
illness or infirmity.’” Id. at 81 (omission in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(4)). Id.
at 80 (concluding that two-way closed-circuit television testimony “preserved all of [the]
characteristics of in-court testimony” where the witness “was sworn; he was subject to
cross examination; he testified in full view of the jury, court, and defense counsel; and [he]
gave his testimony under the eye of [the defendant’ himself.”).
74
Id. at 81. (“[T]he Supreme Court crafted [the Craig-public policy] standard to
constrain the use of one-way closed-circuit television, whereby the witness could not
possibly view the defendant. Because Judge Weinstein employed a two-way system that
preserved the face-to-face confrontation celebrated by Coy, it is not necessary to enforce
the Craig standard in this case . . . .It forced Savino to testify before the jury, and allowed
them to judge his credibility through his demeanor and comportment; under Rule 15
practice, the bare transcript of Savino’s deposition could have been admitted which could
have precluded any visual assessment of his demeanor. Closed-circuit testimony also
allowed Gigante’s attorney to weigh the impact of Savino’s direct testimony on the jury as
he crafted a cross-examination.”).
75
Id.
76
Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F. 3d 306, 310 (5th Cir. 2007).
77
United States v. Benson, 79 F. App’x 813, 820 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
78
Horn, 508 F. 3d at 313 (“In Horn’s case, given the trial court’s efforts to confirm
Birk’s illness and inability to travel an the care with which the other aspects of Horn’s
confrontation rights were preserved, we cannot say that the decision to permit Birk to
testify via two-way closed-circuit television constituted an unreasonable application of
established Federal law.”).
73
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testified from their hospital bed via two-way VTC.79 Significantly, much
like the court in Gigante, the Horn court also held that the VTC procedure
used preserved all of the characteristics of in-court testimony because the
witness was sworn in under oath; he was subject to full cross-examination;
and he testified in full view of the defendant, jury, court, and defense
counsel.80
Other courts have declined to extend the right of Confrontation to
VTC testimony, and explicitly reject the premise that VTC may, in
circumstances like those in Craig, pass constitutional muster. In United
States v. Shabazz, the United States Navy Marine Court of Criminal
Appeals81 held that that the accused’s Sixth Amendment confrontation
right was violated where the district court judge failed to ensure the
reliability of VTC testimony of a witness.82 In the illegal drug distribution
and maiming court-martial, and the government’s key witness testified
from California via VTC as she was unwilling to return to Okinawa, Japan
due to safety concerns.83 Unlike Gigante, the fundamental issue in this
case was the reliability of the testimony rather than the necessity of VTC
itself. The defendant alleged on appeal that the witness was coached
during her testimony, and that the military judge erred both in allowing the
witness to testify via VTC and in failing to strike her testimony once it was
shown to have been tainted. 84 The court found it unnecessary to address
the case-specific finding prong of the Craig analysis because the court
determined that the trial judge failed to ensure the reliability of the
testimony, and ultimately held that VTC testimony was constitutionally
inadmissible absent sufficient indicia of reliability.85
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s rationale in Craig, some Federal
Courts have rejected generalized allegations of harm, particularly to
vulnerable groups like children, as sufficient justification for relaxing a
79

Id. at 313.
Id. at 319.
81
United States v. Shabazz, 52 M.J. 585, 586 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
82
At the time of Shabazz, the Military Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were nearly identical regarding the issue of VTC testimony—
they both were, and remain up to this point, silent on the issue. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P.
26 (evidently silent on the issue of remote testimony after the Court’s rejection of proposed
Rule 26(b)) with R.C.M. 914(A) (evidently silent on the issue of remote testimony, but
allowing remote testimony by children pursuant to the Craig standard).
83
Shabazz, 52 M.J. at 590-91.
84
Id. at 592.
85
Id. at 594 (“Not knowing the extent of the taint upon her testimony, and Mrs. White
being the key witness to the maiming charge, we cannot find harmless error in this case.
Findaing material prejudice to a substantial right of the appellant, we will provide
relief . . . .”). The court’s emphasis on the reliability of the testimony illustrates the preCrawford understanding of the Confrontation Clause as a substantive guarantee. See supra
notes 49-51.
80
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defendant’s right to confrontation.86 In United States v. Bordeaux and
United States v. Turning Bear, the Eighth Circuit rejected the use of VTC
procedures motivated by the same case-specific, public policy concern in
Craig—to protect an alleged child victim of sexual abuse from the
emotional trauma of testifying in the presence of the defendant.87 Unlike
the Second Circuit in Gigante, the Eighth Circuit held that Craig
controlled the determination of whether to permit VTC testimony, given
that both one-way and two-way VTC systems are virtual formats.88
However, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to make a
sufficient showing that the child’s fear of the defendant was the primary
reason she could not testify, and determined that the in the case of both
one-way and two-way VTC testimony, neither system was “likely to lead
a witness to tell the truth to the same degree that a face-to-fact
confrontation does.” 89 The court holding necessarily implied that a per se
categorical exception in this context was inapplicable, suggesting that
justification beyond general discomfort of the witness is needed to
outweigh a defendant’s right to confrontation.
Similarly, in 2006, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the use of VTC
testimony on the grounds that public policy interests such as the
prosecution’s ability to present its case in chief are insufficient to satisfy
the necessity prong of the Craig standard.90 In United States v. Yates, two
Australian witnesses were unwilling to travel to the United States to testify
against the defendant, and the district court permitted them to testify via
VTC.91 Unlike Gigante, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Craig standard
requiring a case-specific finding that VTC be necessary to further an
important public policy, and found that the prosecution’s interest in

86

See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F. 3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Turning Bear, 357 F. 3d 730 (8th Cir. 2004).
87
Bordeaux, 400 F. 3d at 552; Turning Bear, 357 F. 3d at 730.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 554 (noting that whether a two-way system could preserve the necessary features
of confrontation would turn on “hard logistical questions” including the size and placement
of the monitor and whether the camera angle would “render the theoretical promise of the
two-way system practically unattainable,” the court held that, “‘Confrontation’ through a
two-way closed-circuit television is not different enough from ‘confrontation’ via a oneway closed to justify different treatment under Craig.”); Turning Bear, 357 F. 3d at 736
(holding the trial court’s finding were insufficient to satisfy the Craig requirement that the
child be “traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the
defendant.”).
90
United States v. Yates, 438 F. 2d 1307, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc); But see
Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F. 2d 926, 930 (11th Cir. 2001) (allowing the admission of
VTC testimony because the Eleventh Circuit was satisfied that the district court properly
applied the Craig standard).
91
Id. at 1310.
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presenting their “crucial evidence” was insufficient to carry the day.92
Emphasizing that BTC testimony must be necessary rather than merely
convenient, the court cautioned that allowing prosecutors to adopt VTC
procedures in any case where a witness’s evidence was crucial would
undermine the fundamental importance of the witness’s presence,
evidently counter to the primary intent of the Clause.93
These cases demonstrate a clear lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court or a federal rule of criminal procedure, resulting in conflicting
rationales and inconsistent determinations regarding the use of VTC
testimony in criminal cases. In a span of eight years, the Shabazz court
declined to apply Craig and overturned the district court’s use of VTC
testimony because of a particular, case-specific question of reliability.94
Meanwhile, that same year, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
use of VTC testimony in Gigante by extending Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to the use of VTC and finding the exceptional
circumstances requirement satisfied.95 In Bordeaux and Turning Bear, the
Eighth Circuit rejected the Second Circuits distinction between one-way
and two-way VTC, declined to extend Rule 15 to VTC testimony, and
ultimately rejected the use of VTC procedures motivated by the same casespecific, public policy concern in Craig.96 Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits, in applying the Craig standard, determined that
under certain circumstances, public policy concerns such as those in
Craig, and beyond, are sufficient to satisfy the confrontation right.97 And
in 2006, contrary to its 2001 ruling in Harrell v. Butterworth permitting
the use of VTC testimony because the district court properly applied
Craig, the Eleventh Circuit held in Yates that the interests of the
prosecution in presenting its case in chief is insufficient to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause.98

IV.

COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS AND CONFLICTING EFFORTS
AT RECONCILIATION

With very limited guidance, federal courts seem to have taken three
different approaches in considering the issue of VTC testimony in the
criminal context. That said, courts seem to be consistently applying the
Craig standard to the issue of VTC testimony. Courts holding VTC
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 1316.
Id.
See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause have applied Craig, yet
found the testimony unconstitutional because the prosecution failed to
demonstrate it was necessary to further an important public policy.99
Courts that have held VTC constitutional have either applied Craig and
found that: (1) the public policy standard was satisfied;100 or (2) looked to
the Rule 15 “exceptional circumstances” standard for guidance.101 This
suggests that VTC testimony may be constitutionally permissible under
certain circumstances upon a particularized showing of a compelling need.
However, courts remain split as to which public policies justify its use and
which standard should be applied—”exceptional circumstances”102 or
“case-specific finding necessary to further an important public policy.”103
The following three sections provide an evaluation of the viability of
each of the three distinct approaches adopted by the Federal courts in
assessing the constitutionality of VTC testimony.

A.
Option Number 1: Gigante’s “Unavailable Witness” and
“Exceptional Circumstances” Standard Based on Rule 15
The Gigante standard’s misplaced reliance on the purportedly
analogous Rule 15 standard has three glaring and fatal flaws: (1) the
“exceptional circumstances” standard accorded to a deposition is
insufficient to justify the admission of live testimony; (2) the rule is
seemingly oblivious to the fact that confrontation is satisfied in a Rule 15
deposition; and (3) the court declined to apply the Craig standard on the
grounds of an arbitrary distinction between one-way VTC (which the
Craig determined is ordinarily insufficient to satisfy the confrontation
right) and the two-way system used here, which Judge Weinstein
concluded preserved the face-to-face confrontation championed in Coy. 104
The purpose behind allowing VTC testimony is enabling unavailable
witnesses to testify as though they were in court. The Gigante standard is
99

Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F. 3d 306, 306 (5th Cir. 2007).
Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F. 2d 926 (11th Cir. 2001).
101
United States v. Gigante, 166 F. 3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999).
102
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
103
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
104
Id. at 81 (“[T]he Supreme Court crafted [the Craig-public policy] standard to
constrain the use of one-way closed-circuit television, whereby the witness could not
possibly view the defendant. Because Judge Weinstein employed a two-way system that
preserved the face-to-face confrontation celebrated by Coy, it is not necessary to enforce
the Craig standard in this case . . . .It forced Savino to testify before the jury, and allowed
them to judge his credibility through his demeanor and comportment; under Rule 15
practice, the bare transcript of Savino’s deposition could have been admitted which could
have precluded any visual assessment of his demeanor. Closed-circuit testimony also
allowed Gigante’s attorney to weigh the impact of Savino’s direct testimony on the jury as
he crafted a cross-examination.”).
100
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“of dubious validity under the Confrontation Clause”105 because the
standard for admission applied to live testimony in Craig is substantially
higher than standard for admission applied to out-of-court statements.
Moreover, Rule 15 allows the defendant to be physically presented during
a Rule 15 deposition, and therefore the defendant’s right of confrontation
is satisfied.106
Despite the Gigante court permitting the use of VTC testimony in this
particular instance, the court nonetheless emphasized the fact that two-way
VTC testimony should not be considered a commonplace substitute for
traditional, in-court testimony by a witness. 107 By overextending the scope
of the Craig rule to instances beyond considerations of public policy, the
Gigante standard provides too much flexibility and potential for abuse.
The Confrontation Clause is intended primarily to compel witness to make
accusations in give testimony in the defendant’s presence—it does not
follow that one-way VTC, which Craig says does not ordinarily pass
Confrontation Clause muster, becomes full-fledged confrontation when
reciprocal transmission is added.108 The Gigante court fails to
acknowledge the importance of Craig-like “necessity” standard in their
analysis of VTC, and therefore the Gigante standard must be rejected.

B.
Option Number 2: Horn’s “Unavailable Witness” and
“Cross-Examination” Standard Based on Crawford
The Horn standard is much more practical than the Gigante standard,
as it attempts to preserve, and arguably does preserve, three of the four
fundamental elements of confrontation: (1) testimony under oath; (2)
witness cross-examination; and (3) an opportunity to assess the demeanor
of the witness functionally equivalent to that accorded to live testimony.109
105

207 F.R.D. 89 at 94.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(b) (“The officer having custody of a defendant shall be
notified of the time and place set for the examination and shall, unless the defendant waives
in writing the right to be present, produce the defendant at the examination and keep the
defendant in the presence of the witness during the examination . . . .”).
107
Gigante, 166 F. 2d at 81 (“[T]here may well be intangible elements of the ordeal of
testifying in a courtroom that are reduced or even eliminated by remote testimony.”).
108
207 F.R.D. at 94 (explaining that traditional, face-to-face confrontation “is not
equivalent to making [accusations against the defendant] in a room that contains a
television set beaming electrons that portray the defendant’s image.”). (internal quotation
marks omitted).
109
Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F. 3d 306, 313 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In Horn’s case, given the
trial court’s efforts to confirm Birk’s illness and inability to travel an the care with which
the other aspects of Horn’s confrontation rights were preserved, we cannot say that the
decision to permit Birk to testify via two-way closed-circuit television constituted an
unreasonable application of established Federal law.”); Cf. Gigante, 166 F. 3d at 80
(concluding that two-way closed-circuit television testimony “preserved all of [the]
106
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In Horn, counsel for both the defendant and the prosecution were present,
in the witness’s hospital room, when the witness gave his testimony.110
The witness was sworn in under oath, subject to cross-examination, and
testified in full view of the defendant and the jury.111 These procedural
guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability are certainly considerations
that should be included in any Federal law regulating VTC testimony.112
However, like the Gigante standard, so too is the Horne standard
noticeably lacking a “necessity” prong, which the Court has stated must
be satisfied any time a defendant is denied physical, face-to-face
confrontation.113 Any categorical approach to the regulation of VTC
testimony based on Crawford must be rejected because VTC testimony is
live testimony, given in real-time and received by the court as if the
witness were testifying in person; whereas Crawford address the
admission of prior out-of-court statements being offered against the
defendant.114 Contrary to the dissent’s reasoning in Yates, which
determined that Crawford is the correct standard and Craig is inapplicable
on the grounds that VTC testimony is an “out-of-court statement” within
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,115 any test based on Crawford
would overextend the meaning of hearsay and belittle the importance of
Craig in evaluating remote witness VTC testimony.

C.
Option Number 3: Yate’s “Case-Specific Finding that VTC
is Necessary to Further an Important Public Policy” Standard
Based on Craig
While VTC testimony is neither the functional nor constitutional
equivalent of testimony given by a witness physically present at trial, the
characteristics of in-court testimony” where the witness “was sworn; he was subject to
cross examination; he testified in full view of the jury, court, and defense counsel; and [he]
gave his testimony under the eye of [the defendant’ himself.”).
110
Id. at 313.
111
Id. at 319.
112
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate
goal is to ensure the reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”).
113
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (concluding that exceptions to the
confrontation clause should apply “only when necessary to further an important public
policy”).
114
Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990) with Crawford, 541 U.S. at
61.
115
United States v. Yates, 438 F. 2d 1307, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2006)(Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the Craig standard is inapplicable because VTC testimony is
hearsay and therefore may not be analyzed in the same “constitutional context” as Craig);
Id. at 1332 (Marcus, J., dissenting) (explaining that the facts of Yates “were so far removed
from the original scope of Craig as to render Craig inapplicable”).

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

135

Supreme Court has consistently held that face-to-face confrontation is not
an absolute guarantee under the Confrontation Clause.116 And the Supreme
Court has made it very clear that a defendant’s right to confrontation may
be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation, “but only where
denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy.”117 Craig, Coy, and the Supreme Court’s rejection of the proposed
amendment to Rule 26 all suggest that any time a defendant cannot
physically confront an adverse witness face-to-face in open court, the
exception must be necessary to further an important public policy.
Therefore, the Craig standard, as applied in Yates, requiring a casespecific finding that VTC is necessary to further an important public
policy, must form the basis of any rule controlling VTC testimony because
it is the only rule that demands what the constitution requires to suppress
a criminal defendant’s fundamentally guaranteed rights under the Sixth
Amendment—necessity. Although two-way, closed-circuit VTC does not
allow a defendant to physically confront accusatory witnesses in a manner
functionally equivalent to trial118—an element of VTC testimony that
simply cannot be reconciled with the Confrontation Clause—VTC
jurisprudence has demonstrated that the “necessary to further an important
public policy standard” is not limited solely to the facts of Craig or the
context of child abuse cases.119 Thus, because two-way VTC testimony
does not permit face-to-face confrontation, and the Craig rule applies to
contexts beyond child abuse cases, Craig best strikes a balance between a
defendant’s right of confrontation and the benefits of VTC testimony.

Craig, 497 U.S. at 847 (explaining the court has “nevertheless recognized that [faceto-face] confrontation is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right”)
117
Id. at 850(emphasis added); see also Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
118
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 89 (plurality opinion) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161) (“[T]he
mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of
the truth determining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of fact [has] a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony].’”).
119
See id.; see also United States v. Shabazz, 52 M.J. 585 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999);
Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F. 2d 926 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Because the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision—that the witnesses’ testimony via two-way, closed-circuit satellite
transmission did not violate [the defendant’s] constitutional rights—was neither contrary
to, nor an unreasonable application of, Federal law set forth by Supreme Cases, we
AFFIRM [sic].”); United States v. Benson, 79 F. App’x 813 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
116
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A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO COVID-19?

A.
Is this particular violation of the Constitution,
constitutional?
A categorical approach to limiting a criminal defendant’s right to
confrontation that permits VTC testimony where a witness is unavailable
to testify due to COVID-19 raises fundamental question of due process.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.120 And the fundamental liberties protected by this Clause include,
inter alia, most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.121 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “the Sixth Amendment’s right
of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental right
made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”122
Therefore, the constitutionality of a rule purported to infringe upon a
criminal defendant’s fundamental right to confrontation must be analyzed
under strict scrutiny.
In determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a
government entity from taking an action that infringes upon an
individual’s fundamentally guaranteed right to confront an adverse
witness, our initial inquiry must address two questions: (1) whether the
action is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest; and (2)
whether the act constitutes the least restrictive means by which to further
that interest.123 That said, the inquiry goes beyond merely assessing the
means by which to achieve a certain end. The modern Constitutional
analysis is characterized by a reasonableness standard, as opposed to the
Framer’s intent at the time of an emergency.124

i. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell
During the Great Depression in 1933, Minnesota responded to a large
number of home foreclosures in the state by passing the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Law which extended the amount of time for
mortgagors to redeem their mortgages from foreclosure contrary to the

120

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-149 (1968).
122
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1965); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); see also Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970) (emphasis added).
123
See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
124
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426-30.
121
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terms previously agreed upon in the mortgage contract.125 Home Building
& Loan Association was a mortgage lending company that objected to the
law on the grounds that it violated the Contract Clause, Due Process
Clause, and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.126 The Association brought suit against
Blaisdell, the official charged with administering the new law, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately upheld the law as a valid exercise of
state power.127 The Association appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.128
The narrow question before the court was whether a Minnesota law
that extended the amount of time for mortgagors to redeem their mortgages
from foreclosure during the Great Depression violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.129 More generally, the question before the court was whether
a government actor can limit a parties’ contractual rights, in derogation of
the Contracts Clause, during times of emergency.130 The Court ultimately
held that an emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper
occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect the
vital interests of the community, and the conditions upon which the period
of redemption is extended did not appear to be unreasonable.131
Writing for the Court, Justice Hughes explained that an emergency
does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions
imposed upon powers or reservations: “the Constitution was adopted in a
period of grave emergency, and its grants of power to the federal
government and its limitations of power of the States were determined in
the light of emergency, and they are not altered by emergency.”132
However, while an emergency does not create power, it may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power.133 Thus, the constitutional question in
light of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the
particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions.134 Where the
constitutional grants and limitations of power are set forth in general
125

Id. at 415-24.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 328.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 432-34.
132
Id. at 425.
133
Id.
134
Id. (“Where the constitutional grants and limitations of power are set forth in general
clauses, which afford a broad outline, the process of construction is essential to fill in the
details.”); see also i Id. at 429 (“It cannot be maintained that that [a] constitutional
prohibition should be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with
respect to the enforcement of [that right] if made necessary by great public calamity.”).
126
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clauses, which afford a broad outline, the process of construction is
essential to fill in the details.135

ii. Korematsu v. United States
On May 9, 1942, under Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, based on
Executive Order 9066, Japanese-Americans were ordered to move to
relocation camps in light of the United states’ involvement in World War
II.136 Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 specifically excluded JapaneseAmericans from remaining in San Leandro, California—a region
designated as a “Military Area.”137 Exclusion order No. 34 declared that
“the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection
against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material,
national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities . . . .”138
Korematsu was an American citizen of Japanese descent who was
convicted by the United States government in federal district court for
violating Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, and Korematsu appealed to the
United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the Civilian Exclusion
Order was unconstitutional, and claimed that when the exclusion order was
enacted, all danger of Japanese invasion of the exclusion area had
disappeared.139 The question before the court was rather straightforward:
whether Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, an Executive Order requiring
Japanese Americans to relocate to internment camps during World war II,
was constitutional.140
The Court ultimately rejected the constitutional challenge on the broad
grounds that “exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew,141 has
a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and
sabotage,”142 which Congress deemed to be a compelling governmental
interest. Writing for the Korematsu Court, Justice Black explained that the
Court cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of the Japanese

Id. at 429 (“It cannot be maintained that that [a] constitutional prohibition should be
so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect to the
enforcement of [that right] if made necessary by great public calamity.”).
136
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944).
137
Id. at 217.
138
Id. (citing Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407.).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
142
Id. at 218.
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population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly
ascertained. 143
The Court reasoned that exclusion of those of Japanese origin was
deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of
disloyal members of the group, “most of whom we have no doubt were
loyal to this country.”144 The Court pointed out that there were, in fact,
Americans of Japanese ancestry who “retained loyalties”145 to Japan,
which was confirmed by investigations made subsequent to the
exclusion—approximately five thousand American citizens of Japanese
ancestry. Justice Black explained that Korematsu was excluded because
the country was at war with the Japanese empire, not because of hostility
to him or his race.146 He was excluded because the properly constituted
military authorities felt compelled to take proper security measures for the
safety of the American people—”because they decided that the necessity
and urgency of the situation demanded all citizens of Japanese descent to
be temporarily segregated from the west coast.” 147 And the court held that
Congress, in reposing its confidence in the time of war to our nation’s
military leaders—”as inevitably it must be—determined that they should
have the power to do just that.”148

B.

The Means Justify the End.

These cases are meant to illustrate that the various crises of human
affairs often demand the properly delegated authorities act for the
necessity of furthering an important public policy, in contravention of a
fundamentally guaranteed right. Protecting the lives of criminal
defendants, witnesses, jurors, judges, attorneys, and the public at large
from the grave and palpable danger of exposure to the COVID-19 virus is
certainly a compelling government interest that rises to the level of
Blaisdell. And even more so, necessary to further an important public
policy. VTC technology ensures the health and safety of every individual
involved in the litigation process and best preserves the fundamental
elements of confrontation at trial. As Chief Justice John Marshall said, “we
must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding . . . .[i]
Intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to
Id. (“We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have
ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and
separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which
demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it.”).
144
Id. at 218-19.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 223.
147
Id. (emphasis added).
148
Id.
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the various crises of human affairs”149 The manner in which VTC
testimony is adopted in our court system will set a precedent for the way
future advancements in technology are embraced and assimilated in the
future. Therefore, it is crucial that the Court and/or Congress approach this
question with extreme caution. However, our response to the COVID-19
pandemic, and our rapid adoption of VTC technology to facilitate our
justice system in a time of national emergency, demonstrates the need for
a rule addressing the issue of virtual confrontation immediately. This note
recommends that until such a time as courts have more definitive guidance
on the issue, the Craig standard should be applied in determining the
admission of VTC testimony.

149

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (Chief Justice John Marshall writing
for the Court explained that, “congress may expound the nature and extent of the authority
under which it acts, and that this practical interpretation had become incorporated into the
Constitution).

